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Kliman on Systemic Fear:  
A Rejoinder 
 
Shimshon Bichler and Jonathan Nitzan 
 
Editors’ Note: Andrew Kliman’s paper in this issue, ‘Value and Crisis: Bichler and Nitzan 
versus Marx’, consists of two sections. The first section deals with Bichler and Nitzan’s 
recent paper on ‘Systemic Fear, Modern Finance and the Future of Capitalism’ (2010). 
The second section takes issue with their earlier critique of Marx’s labour theory of value 
(Nitzan and Bichler, 2009a), and offers an explanation of the global economic crisis. In 
the following rejoinder, Bichler and Nitzan address the points raised in the first of these 
sections.  
 
Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction    
    
The first part of Kliman’s paper isn’t exactly a critique. The author doesn’t engage our 
argument, and he shows no concern for the broader theoretical and historical context in 
which this argument is made. Instead, he looks for inconsistencies, discrepancies and 
incompatibilities – faults that in his view pull the rug out from under our entire analysis 
and make such engagement unnecessary to begin with. The gist of his complaint can be 
summarised as follows:  
 
1.  Bichler and Nitzan, he argues, draw conclusions that their own data refute. In their 
2010 article they claim that, in capitalism, systemic fear is revealed solely by the 
breakdown  of  capitalisation  (with  stock  prices  being  positively  and  tightly 
correlated with current earnings). They then argue that such a breakdown occurred 
only during the 1930s and 2000s, and use this observation to infer that capitalists 
have been gripped by systemic fear during these periods. However, according to the 
evidence that they themselves marshal, a positive and tight correlation also existed 
from the early 1950s to the early 1970s. And since the latter period wasn’t one of 
crisis – in fact, it is commonly seen as the ‘golden age’ of capitalism – the notion that 
price-earnings correlations are indicative of systemic fear breaks down. Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 4 (2011) 
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2.  Bichler and Nitzan erroneously assume that capitalism requires capitalists to believe 
that the system will continue forever. The error here is both logical and empirical. 
Simple probability theory suggests that, for a high enough reward, most people will 
invest even when they believe that the capitalist system is very likely to collapse. And 
laboratory experiments, including those reported by Nobel laureates, show that 
people will continue to buy stocks that they know will become worthless by the end 
of the experiment. In other words, capitalists act like capitalists regardless of what 
they think about the future of capitalism. 
 
3.  The very notion of systemic fear is entirely subjective and therefore useless for a 
scientific inquiry. Bichler and Nitzan pretend to show that capital is a historical 
subject capable of bringing capitalism down, but their alleged demonstration relies 
on incoherent terminology and unfalsifiable Freudian speculations. Instead, they 
should go back to the ‘good old fear’ that capitalists feel when struck by a real crisis 
of real profit (as Marx already and perfectly explains in Das Kapital). 
 
The Sleepwalkers The Sleepwalkers The Sleepwalkers The Sleepwalkers    
 
Kliman’s first point is correct, and we are grateful to him for having pointed it out to us. 
The positive correlation between share prices and current earnings indeed is not unique 
to the 1930s and 2000s. As he indicates, a similar correlation exists from the early 1950s 
to the early 1970s – a correlation that we overlooked and failed to mention in our paper. 
However, as this rejoinder shall show, the oversight is hardly critical. It can be easily 
corrected in a manner consistent with both our systemic-fear hypothesis and our broader 
notion of the capitalist mode of power. 
To  begin  with,  Kliman’s  personal  anxieties  notwithstanding,  inconsistency 
need not be lethal. Note that we are dealing here not with a heteronomous dogma, but 
with  the  autonomous,  living  process  of  an  ever-changing  science.1  And  scientific 
discovery, unlike religious reiteration of eternal truths, is littered with oversights and 
errors. They are the bread and butter of the creative process, the serendipitous leeway 
that gives scientists the ability to tease order out of chaos. For academics concerned with 
the health of their career, errors are a recipe for disaster – a risk best avoided by limiting 
oneself to ‘adoptions’, ‘interpretations’ and ‘critiques’. But for creative scientists, making 
errors – and negating them – is the only path to breakthroughs. 
The Pythagoreans erred in their belief that every magnitude can be expressed 
as a rational number. This erroneous conviction, though, helped launch the remarkable 
triangle of democracy-science-philosophy, and the eventual refutation of that conviction 
created  a  much  larger  mathematics  that  incorporated  irrational  as  well  as  rational Kliman on Systemic Fear, Bichler and Nitzan 
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numbers. And the list continues. Kepler’s astronomical research was bogged down for a 
decade by his supposition that celestial orbits were circular rather than elliptical, but that 
mistake sharpened his inquiry and hardly invalidated his broader thesis. Delambre and 
Méchain’s mission to measure the standard meter was full of baffling inaccuracies, but 
those inaccuracies helped trigger the mathematical development of statistical estimates. 
Einstein’s belief in a stationary universe didn’t sit well with his relativity theory, creating 
an inconsistency that he solved by inventing a ‘cosmological constant’; later on, when he 
accepted  that  the  universe  was  expanding,  the  inconsistency  disappeared  and  the 
constant  became  unnecessary  (erroneous?);  and  nowadays,  talk  of  an  accelerating 
universe may end up giving the constant yet another lease on life. The works of Gardiner 
Means  on  administered  prices  and  on  the  separation  of  corporate  control  from 
ownership, although subject to intense empirical criticism, remain two of the most fruitful 
starting points in twentieth-century economics.2 Andrew Wiles’ proof of Fermat’s Last 
Theorem took seven years to produce, only to be found fatally flawed. But two years later, 
the error was corrected, the proof was accepted, and mathematics benefitted from novel 
hypotheses  and  new  areas  of  inquiry  that  Wiles’  torturous  journey  helped  open  up. 
Yutaka  Taniyama,  one  of  the  greatest  sleepwalkers  of  modern  mathematics,  was 
described by his collabourator Guro Shimura as sloppy to the point of laziness: “He was 
gifted with the special capability of making many mistakes, mostly in the right direction. I 
envied him for this and tried in vain to imitate him, but found it quite difficult to make 
good mistakes” (quoted in Singh, 1997, p. 174). This willingness to go astray enabled 
Taniyama  to  come  up  with  a  most  fantastic  conjecture  on  the  symmetry  between 
modular  forms  and  elliptical  equations,  a  conjecture  that  opened  up  multiple  new 
mathematical horizons well before it was finally proven.3  
We, too, sleepwalked. Our concern was systemic fear and systemic crisis, not 
‘business as usual’. We wanted to understand what happens not when capitalists are sure 
of their rule, but when they lose their confidence. We wanted to know how they act not 
when capitalism seems certain, but when it is put into question. And so we overlooked 
what in retrospect seems obvious. 
 
The Broad Context: The Capitalist Mode of Power, Capitalisation and the Stock  The Broad Context: The Capitalist Mode of Power, Capitalisation and the Stock  The Broad Context: The Capitalist Mode of Power, Capitalisation and the Stock  The Broad Context: The Capitalist Mode of Power, Capitalisation and the Stock 
Market Market Market Market    
 
Kliman clings to a technical oversight, presenting it as a ‘make-or-break’ error for our 
broader argument. But by ignoring the argument itself and the overall framework in 
which it is developed, he ends up with a misleading caricature. 
So let us reiterate the broad picture, if only in outline, and in the process try to 
clarify our argument and put things right. Our focus on the twin notion of systemic fear Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 4 (2011) 
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and systemic crisis didn’t come out of the blue. It emerged as part of a new approach to 
capitalism – an approach that offers an alternative to both neoclassical and Marxian 
political economies, and that we have articulated in many articles and books, including 
our recent Capital as Power (Nitzan and Bichler, 2009a). In 2008, we began to write a 
paper series on the ‘Contours of Crisis’; a series that we hope to continue and eventually 
develop into a book (Bichler and Nitzan, 2008, 2009; Nitzan and Bichler, 2009b). The 
article  ‘Systemic  Fear,  Modern  Finance  and  the  Future  of  Capitalism‘  (Bichler  and 
Nitzan, 2010) is an expanded version of the third installment in that series. The series 
introduces and develops the notions of systemic crisis and systemic fear – but it does so 
in steps, gradually rearticulating and refining the terms as the story continues to unfold.  
Mainstream  and  Marxist  political  economies  see  capitalism  as  a  mode  of 
production and/or consumption. Consequently, they both adhere to a double separation 
–  one  between  politics  and  economics;  and  another  between  the  so-called  real  and 
nominal spheres of the economy itself.4 In this framework, the nominal sphere of money, 
credit and finance is merely a mirror – accurate for the neoclassicals, distortive for the 
Marxists – of the underlying ‘economic reality’. From this viewpoint, the only true crises 
are  ‘real’  ones:  crises  of  employment,  production  and  consumption;  crises  of  real 
profitability; crises of real accumulation, crisis of real investment, etc. These crises can be 
trigged by many causes, including government intervention, natural disaster, war, and, of 
course, finance. But whatever their origins, they become meaningful only insofar as they 
materialise in the underlying ‘reality’ of the economy. 
Our framework is very different. Capitalism is not a mode of production and 
consumption, but a mode of power. To understand it, we start not from the narrow 
‘material’ sphere of economics, but from the broad architecture of social power. And even 
when we deal with so-called economic processes, we focus not on productivity and well-
being, but on the power to control productivity and well-being. In this framework, capital 
is not a technological/productive entity that is merely ‘reflected’ in finance. It is not 
machines, structures and work in progess, but a pure quantitative code of power. And that 
code is financial and only financial.  
The central and by now all-pervasive algorithm of the capitalist mode of power 
is capitalisation: the discounting to present value of risk-adjusted expected future income. 
This is the ritual that constantly creorders – or creates the order – of capitalism’s power 
institutions and process. Over the past century, capitalisation has expanded to encompass 
numerous aspects of social life – from the mindset and genetic code of individuals, to 
social organisations and institutions, and even the ecological future of humanity. But the 
most distilled and perfected form of capitalisation remains the stock market. This is the 
chief symbolic barometer of the capitalist outlook; it is the mechanism through which 
capitalists  increasingly  organise  their  world  of  strategic  sabotage  and  differential 
accumulation; and it is the main yardstick with which they gauge their success and failure. Kliman on Systemic Fear, Bichler and Nitzan 
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Major Bear Markets Major Bear Markets Major Bear Markets Major Bear Markets    
 
Systemic crisis is one that threatens the very future of capitalism. The first necessary 
feature of such a crisis is the existence of a major bear market. That was the starting point 
of our paper series. In ‘Contours of Crisis: Plus ça change, plus c'est pareil?’ (Bichler and 
Nitzan, 2008), we explained what we mean by such crises, identified their occurrence in 
the  United  States,  characterised  their  main  features,  and  speculated  about  their 
relationship to broad societal transformations.  
Since there is no agreed-upon definition for a bear market – let alone a ‘major’ 
one – we devised our own:  
 
A major bear market denotes a multi-year period during which: (1) the 
10-year centred moving average of stock prices, expressed in constant 
dollars,  trends  downward;  and  (2)  each  successive  sub-peak  of  the 
underlying price series, expressed in constant dollars, is lower than the 
previous one.5 
 
The reason for expressing stock prices in ‘constant dollars’ is that the capitalist outlook is 
always differential. Modern capitalists do not seek simply to increase their dollar assets, 
but  to  increase  them  faster  than  the  assets  of  others.  Now,  one  of  the  most  basic 
benchmarks for such comparisons is the standard basket of consumer goods and services. 
If the price of equities rises faster than the price of that basket, equity price inflation ends 
up  being  higher  than  overall  Consumer  Price  Index  (CPI)  inflation;  the  so-called 
‘constant dollar’ price of equities increases; and equity owners end up doing better than 
the average basket owner.6 (Of course, beating CPI inflation is merely the first step in a 
long  sequence,  whose  ultimate  achievement  is  beating  the  increase  of  every  existing 
basket, but these further steps need not concern us here.) 
According to the above definition, over the past two centuries, the United 
States has experienced six major bear markets. These periods are marked by the grey 
areas in Figure 1 and are listed in Table 1, along with the cumulative declines in stock 
prices. 
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Figure 1 
U.S. Stock Prices in Constant Dollars U.S. Stock Prices in Constant Dollars U.S. Stock Prices in Constant Dollars U.S. Stock Prices in Constant Dollars    
    
 
 
NOTE: Grey areas indicate major bear markets, as defined in the text and in Table 1. 
The U.S. stock price index splices the following four sub-series: a combination of bank, 
insurance and railroad stock series weighed by Global Financial Data (1820-1870); the 
Cowles/Standard and Poor’s Composite (1871-1925); the 90-stock Composite (1926-
1956); and the S&P 500 (1957-present). The constant dollar series is computed by 
dividing the stock price index by the Consumer Price Index. The last data point is for 
2010. Data are rebased with 1929=100.0 
   
SOURCE: Global Financial Data (series codes: _SPXD for stock prices; CPUSA for 
consumer  prices);  Standard  and  Poor’s  through  Global  Insight  (series  codes: 
SP500@40.D7 and SP500.D7 for stock prices); IMF through Global Insight (series 
code: L64@C111 for consumer prices). 
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Table 1 
Major U.S. Bear Markets* Major U.S. Bear Markets* Major U.S. Bear Markets* Major U.S. Bear Markets*    
(constant (constant (constant (constant- - - -dollar calculations) dollar calculations) dollar calculations) dollar calculations)    
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTE: The most recent sub-trough of the current major bear market occurred in 2008. 
It is not yet clear whether this sub-trough marks the end of this bear market. 
 
* A major bear market is defined as a multiyear period during which: (1) the 10-year 
centred moving average of stock prices, expressed in constant dollars, trends downward; 
and (2) each successive sub-peak of the underlying price series, expressed in constant 
dollars, is lower than the previous one.  
 
** The peak occurs one year prior to the onset of a major bear market. 
 
Clearly, the 1950s and 1960s did not fulfill this first criterion of a systemic crisis: there was 
no bear market, let alone a major one. Although much of the emphasis during that period, 
epitomised in the triumphalist books of John Kenneth Galbraith (1958; 1967), was on 
the  rising  welfare-warfare  state,  the  self-financing  ability  of  the  leading  industrial 
corporations and the alleged demise of finance, the stock market actually boomed – and 
at growth rates that would make today’s neoliberals envious. Capitalism was not in crisis, 
and capitalists certainly had no reason to fear for its future. That is obvious enough. 
 
Major Bear Markets and Societal Transformations Major Bear Markets and Societal Transformations Major Bear Markets and Societal Transformations Major Bear Markets and Societal Transformations    
 
Now, ‘Plus ça change, plus c'est pareil?’ wasn’t merely technical (Bichler and Nitzan, 
2008). It further argued that the long-term ups and downs of the stock market, no matter 
how stylised and patterned, are not self-generating. They don’t just happen on their own. 
PERIOD PERIOD PERIOD PERIOD    
DECLINE FROM PEAK DECLINE FROM PEAK DECLINE FROM PEAK DECLINE FROM PEAK    
TO TROUGH  TO TROUGH  TO TROUGH  TO TROUGH (%) (%) (%) (%)    ** ** ** **    
1835–1842  –50% 
1851–1857  –62% 
1906–1920  –70% 
1929–1948  –56% 
1969–1981  –55% 
2000–2010    –50% Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 4 (2011) 
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Each of them has a reason, and that reason is deeply social and historically unique. Note 
that, during the twentieth century, every oscillation from a major bear market to a bull 
market was accompanied by a systemic societal transformation: 
 
￿  The crisis of 1906–1920 marked the closing of the American Frontier, the shift from 
robber-baron capitalism to  large-scale business enterprise, and the  beginning of 
synchronised finance.  
 
￿  The  crisis  of  1929–1948  signaled  the  end  of  ‘unregulated’  capitalism,  and  the 
emergence of large governments and the welfare-warfare state. 
 
￿  The crisis of 1969–1981 marked the closing of the Keynesian era, the resumption of 
worldwide capital flows and the onset of neoliberal globalisation. 
 
Moreover, the article pointed out that none of these transformations were ‘in the cards’. 
Most observers in the 1900s didn’t expect managerial capitalism to take hold; few in the 
1920s anticipated the welfare-warfare state; and not too many in the 1960s predicted 
neoliberal regulation. All three transformations involved a complex set of conflicts; their 
trajectories were fuzzy, and their outcomes were all but impossible to anticipate. 
In other words, underneath the seemingly oscillating long-term patterns of the 
market  lies  an  open-ended  and  inherently  unpredictable  creordering  of  the  entire 
political economy. Although past bear markets have always given way to long bull runs, 
these transitions were never automatic. Each and every one of them reflected a profound 
transformation  of  the  underlying  societal  structure.  This  quantitative-qualitative 
correspondence, we noted, still holds. In order for the current crisis to end and a new 
long-term upswing to begin, the social structure must be transformed, and the key aspect 
of that transformation is the creordering of capitalist power. 
 
The Capitalist Mode of Power: Approaching the Glass Ceiling The Capitalist Mode of Power: Approaching the Glass Ceiling The Capitalist Mode of Power: Approaching the Glass Ceiling The Capitalist Mode of Power: Approaching the Glass Ceiling    
    
While systemic crisis is always accompanied by a major bear market transformation, the 
reverse is not necessarily true: a major bear market does not have to be associated with 
systemic crisis. Systemic crises are ones that threaten the very future of capitalism, and 
these threats arise only when capitalist power approaches a glass ceiling and it becomes 
difficult if not impossible for capitalist power to increase under existing circumstances. 
These conditions are fairly rare, and they need not exist – and usually do not exist – in 
every major bear market. 
How do we know that capitalist power is approaching its glass ceiling? The 
answer  begins  with  the  nature  of  capitalist  power.  Private  ownership  is  created, Kliman on Systemic Fear, Bichler and Nitzan 
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augmented and protected through organised exclusion, and organised exclusion is always 
a matter of power: it requires strategic sabotage and the threat and occasional use of force. 
Now, capitalism is historically unique in that everything that can be owned can be priced. 
And since ownership is based on power, relative prices quantify the relative power of 
owners: the greater the relative magnitude of the owned assets, the greater the power of 
their owner. In this sense, capitalism is deeply differential, and that differentiality is not 
static, but dynamic. Caught in a never-ending power struggle, capitalists are compelled to 
think of accumulation not absolutely, but relatively. They seek not to meet the average, 
but to beat it; not to keep their distributive share, but to raise it; not to run with the herd, 
but to butt ahead of it. 
As we indicated in ‘Systemic Fear’, though, power is deeply dialectical. As an 
institution of power, private ownership is inherently conflictual: it requires organised 
exclusion, strategic sabotage and the differential exercise of force. And since capitalists are 
conditioned to accumulate differentially, their quest for further redistribution forces them 
to exclude more, inflict greater sabotage and increase the dose of force. But there is a 
built-in limit: no single capitalist or group of capitalists can ever own more than what 
there is to own. So from a certain point onward, further forceful redistribution is bound to 
run into mounting resistance; it gradually grows more difficult to achieve; and, eventually, 
it reaches its own envelope and becomes impossible to sustain. 
This is the glass ceiling, the elusive yet imposing point of hubris to which we 
alluded in ‘Systemic Fear’. It is the societal point where the rulers, having reached their 
maximum power, seem completely confident in the obedience of the ruled. And it is the 
point from which their power and confidence has no where to go but down.  
Have  U.S.  capitalists  reached  this  point  of  hubris?  In  the  second  part  of 
‘Systemic  Fear’,  we  noted  that  much  of  the  postwar  increase  in  stock  prices  was 
accounted for by the self-reinforcing convergence of redistributional power processes. 
During that period, there was a rise in the gross profit and interest share of capitalists in 
national income; a drop in effective corporate tax rates; a decline of profit volatility that 
reduced risk perceptions; and, since the early 1980s, a fall in the rate of interest that 
boosted corporate profit relative to interest payments and lowered the discount rate. 
Now, since these processes are self-exhaustive, the question is: at what point do they 
become impossible to maintain, and how far is the U.S. political economy from reaching 
that point?  
One quick way to address this question is to examine the size distribution of 
income. This measure is far from ideal. Limited to income size, it says nothing explicit 
about the distribution between capitalists and non-capitalists (although it is reasonable to 
assume that much of the top income is earned by capitalists); it ignores the differential 
processes of accumulation that affect the distribution of income and assets within capital; Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 4 (2011) 
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and it tell us little about the non-income power underpinnings of capitalisation.7 But the 
size distributional measure has one major advantage: thanks to the painstaking work of a 
few researchers, its data are available for an extended period, from 1917 to 2008. 
Such data are presented in Figure 2. The thin line shows the per cent share of 
‘market income’, inclusive of capital gains, accounted for by the top 10% of the U.S. 
population. The thick line expresses the 5-year moving average of the underlying series.  
 
Figure 2 
Income Share of the Top 10% of the U.S. Population Income Share of the Top 10% of the U.S. Population Income Share of the Top 10% of the U.S. Population Income Share of the Top 10% of the U.S. Population    
    
 
 
NOTE:  Income  is  defined  as  ‘market  income’,  including  capital  gains;  it  excludes 
government  transfers.  Grey  areas  indicate  periods  during  which  the  5-year  moving 
average of the data series exceeded 45%. The last data point is for 2008; 
   
SOURCE: Piketty, Thomas, and Saez. 2004. Income Inequality in the United States, 
1913-2002.  Monograph,  pp.  1-92.  Updated  until  2008  at 
http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/~saez/TabFig2008.xls;  data  sheet:  data-Figure1 
(retrieved on February 7, 2011).  
 
The numbers draw a striking U-pattern, with its twin peaks marked by the 1930s on the 
left and the 2000s on the right. In both periods, the income share of the top 10% of the Kliman on Systemic Fear, Bichler and Nitzan 
 
 
 
103 
population averaged over 45% and at some point approached 50%. And both periods are 
unique. In between, from the early 1940s to the early 1980s, the numbers are far lower, 
averaging less than 35% and hardly changing from year to year.  
Of course, historical patterns per se do not reveal their own glass ceiling (which 
is why economists can never specify the  maximum amount  of profit, or the  highest 
possible growth rate). But although there is no way to know for sure, it seems to us, 
however impressionistically, that 45% is fairly close to the glass ceiling for this measure. 
The bull market of the 1980s and 1990s was associated with a rise of more than 40% in 
the top’s income share (from 33% to 47%, and to nearly 50% more recently), along with 
significant reductions in interest rates, effective corporate tax rates and profit volatility. 
And since the latter reductions would be difficult to replicate, a similar bull run from here 
onward would require the top income share to rise to more than 70%. Such an increase is 
highly improbable – that is, unless the U.S. turns into a dictatorship of the kind described 
in Jack London’s Iron Heel (1907) or Vladimir Sorokin’s Day of the Oprichnik (2011). 
And given that in the 1930s the top income share peaked at around current levels, it is not 
far fetched to take 45% as the Zeno-like cutoff point beyond which the ruling class enters 
hubris territory: confident in its enormous power, but aware that this power is difficult to 
increase much further.8 
So now we have two criteria for systemic crisis: (1) a major bear market; and 
(2)  extreme  income  and  asset  inequality,  indicative  of  peak  capitalist  power  and  an 
inability to increase that power significantly. It is at this point, when these two conditions 
of systemic crisis are fulfilled, that systemic fear – fear for the very future of capitalism – 
becomes  possible.  And  according  to  the  available  data,  these  two  conditions  have 
coincided only twice since the First World War: during the the late 1920s and 1930s, and 
again during the 2000s. 
 
The Dominant Dogma and Forward The Dominant Dogma and Forward The Dominant Dogma and Forward The Dominant Dogma and Forward- - - -Looking Capitalisation Looking Capitalisation Looking Capitalisation Looking Capitalisation    
 
Now,  note  that  these  two  conditions  imply  a  potential  for  systemic  fear.  To  know 
whether capitalists have actually been struck by such fear, we need a third condition. And 
that third condition is the breakdown of forward-looking capitalisation.  
In our ‘Systemic Fear’, we argued that, under the normal circumstances of 
‘business as usual’, capitalists are conditioned by their dominant dogma to follow the 
ritual of capitalisation; that, in following this ritual, they express their belief that their 
system is eternal; and that this belief in turn implies that they are confident in their rule 
and in the obedience of the ruled (we deal with Kliman’s objection to this point later in 
the article). 
However, in times of systemic crisis – i.e., when capitalism is mired in a major Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 4 (2011) 
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bear market, and when extreme inequalities, having pushed capital toward its envelope, 
make further increases in power difficult if not impossible to achieve – there arises the 
prospect of systemic fear. If that fear takes hold, with capitalists no longer certain of the 
future  of  their  system,  their  ability  to  look  forward  is  seriously  impaired.  And  when 
looking into the future becomes impossible, the ritual of forward-looking finance breaks 
down.  
One indication of such a breakdown, we argued in our paper, is a tight, positive 
correlation between the rates  of  change of stock prices and  current earnings. When 
capitalists adhere to the capitalisation ritual, they price stocks based on the earnings trend 
all the way to the deep future (from the ‘standpoint of eternity’, as finance guru Benjamin 
Graham put it). But when capitalists are struck by systemic fear, the ritual breaks down, 
by definition. With the future of capitalism deeply uncertain, the long-term earnings 
trend  becomes  undefined,  and  undefined  earnings  cannot  be  incorporated  into  the 
capitalisation formula. So capitalists have to look for an alternative. They need something 
they are sure of and which is visible here and now. And that something, we argued, is 
current earnings.  
Now  note  the  causal  direction  here:  systemic  fear  creates  a  tight  positive 
correlation  between  the  growth  rates  of  equity  prices  and  current  earnings.  But  the 
reverse isn’t necessarily true: in and of itself, a positive correlation between the growth 
rates of equity prices and current earnings does not necessarily mean that capitalists have 
been struck by systemic fear.  
This point wasn’t properly articulated in our paper, so it is important to clarify 
it. To reiterate, according to the forward-looking capitalisation formula, equity prices 
discount  the  long-term  earnings  trend.  Current  earnings  do  not  appear  in  the 
capitalisation formula, so in principle they should have no direct impact on share prices.9 
However,  current  earnings  can  still  have  an  indirect,  apparent  effect.  During  certain 
periods,  one  or  more  of  the  capitalisation  components  can  become  correlated  with 
current earnings, and if that happens, we may end up with a spurious correlation. For 
instance,  changes  in  current  earnings  could  be  –  and  sometimes  are  –  correlated 
negatively with changes in the rate of interest. And since the rate of interest features in 
capitalisation, the result could be a spurious correlation between the growth rates of 
current earnings and stock prices. Indeed, there is nothing to prevent such a spurious 
correlation from cropping up during periods of systemic fear; and if it does crop up, the 
impact of current earnings on equity prices may become more difficult to disentangle.10  
For this reason, the correlation between the growth rates of stock prices and 
current earnings becomes meaningful only in times of systemic crisis. It is only then, 
when capitalism is pulled down by a major bear market and capitalists are approaching 
their hubris-point of peak power, that such a correlation could be taken as indicative of 
systemic fear. Kliman on Systemic Fear, Bichler and Nitzan 
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Figure 3 shows the levels and rates of change of equity prices and earnings per 
share (with rates of change expressed as 3-year moving averages). The grey areas indicate 
periods of high positive correlation between the rate-of-growth series at the bottom of the 
figures (including the period pointed out by Kliman). The correlation coefficients for the 
different periods are listed in Table 2. 
 
Figure 3 
S&P 500: Price and Earnings per Share, 1871 S&P 500: Price and Earnings per Share, 1871 S&P 500: Price and Earnings per Share, 1871 S&P 500: Price and Earnings per Share, 1871- - - -2011 2011 2011 2011    
    
 
 
NOTE: Earnings per share denote net profits per share earned in the previous twelve 
months. Monthly earnings are interpolated from annual data before 1926 and from 
quarterly data after 1926. Stock price data are monthly averages of daily closing prices. 
Both series are expressed in $U.S. and rebased with September 1929=100. The last data Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 4 (2011) 
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points are June 2010 for earnings per share and January 2011 for price; SOURCE: 
Robert Shiller, http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data/ie_data.xls.  
 
Table 2 
S&P 500: Pearson Correlation Coefficient Between the S&P 500: Pearson Correlation Coefficient Between the S&P 500: Pearson Correlation Coefficient Between the S&P 500: Pearson Correlation Coefficient Between the    
Annual Rates of Growth of Price and Earnings per Share Annual Rates of Growth of Price and Earnings per Share Annual Rates of Growth of Price and Earnings per Share Annual Rates of Growth of Price and Earnings per Share    
(Monthly data expressed as 3-year moving averages)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Figure 3. 
 
The data show four periods of high positive correlation: the period leading up to 1917; 
the 1930s; the early 1950s to the early 1970s; and, finally, the 2000s. But based on our 
earlier discussion, only two of these periods can be associated with systemic fear. This 
association is summarised in the timeline of Table 3, which provides data on our three 
criteria for systemic fear. The table covers the period from the 1820s to the present, 
although the data coverage is uneven and allows conclusions to be drawn only from 1917 
onwards.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P P P PERIOD ERIOD ERIOD ERIOD     C C C CORRELATION  ORRELATION  ORRELATION  ORRELATION C C C COEFFICI OEFFICI OEFFICI OEFFICIENT ENT ENT ENT    
    Jan 1873 – Oct 1917  + 0.72 
   Oct 1917 – Mar 2010  + 0.35  
Oct 1917 – Dec 1929  + 0.29 
Dec 1929 – Feb 1939  + 0.89 
Feb 1939 – Jun 1953  – 0.34 
Jun 1953 – Aug 1962  + 0.90 
Aug 1962 – Dec 1973  + 0.80 
Dec 1973 – Sep 2000  – 0.20 
S u b   p e r i o d s  
Sep 2000 – Mar 2010  + 0.65 Kliman on Systemic Fear, Bichler and Nitzan 
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Table 3 
Criteria for Systemic Crises in the United States Criteria for Systemic Crises in the United States Criteria for Systemic Crises in the United States Criteria for Systemic Crises in the United States    
 
 
 
NOTE: Grey areas denote periods of (1) major bear markets; (2) peaks of capitalist 
power as indicated by extreme income inequality; and (3) periods of a high positive 
correlation between the growth rates of share prices and earnings per share. The dashed 
lines delineate the two periods that fulfil all three criteria: 1929–1939 and 2000–2010. 
   
SOURCE: Figures 1, 2 and 3.  
 
￿  The first criterion is a major bear market, based on the long-term trend and pattern 
of the stock market expressed in ‘constant dollars’. Based on these considerations, 
the United States has experienced six major bear markets since the 1820s.  
 
￿  The second criterion is peak capitalist power, based on extreme income inequality. 
This condition has been fulfilled twice since 1917: from 1927 to 1940 and from 
2000 to 2008 (with the stock market having recovered since 2008, it is not far Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 4 (2011) 
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fetched  to  assume  that  income  inequality  continues  to  hover  at  peak  levels). 
Combining these two conditions, we can conclude that only two of the four major 
bear markets since the beginning of the twentieth century have contained a systemic 
crisis: the periods from 1929 to 1940 and the period from 2000 to 2010. 
 
￿  The criterion for systemic fear is systemic crisis during which the rates of change of 
stock prices and current earnings are tightly and positively correlated. Such positive 
correlation  existed  during  four  periods  since  the  1890s.  But  only  two  of  these 
periods were ones of systemic crisis: 1929-1939 and 2000-2010.11  
 
In sum: Kliman found an oversight in our paper on ‘Systemic Fear’ and celebrated it as if 
it  pulled  the  rug  out  from  under  our  entire  argument.  But  that  oversight,  although 
inconvenient and regrettable, hardly dents our broader argument. Capitalism remains the 
first mode of power to offer a quantitative indicator for systemic fear. This indicator 
involves the convergence of three conditions that we have discussed at great length in our 
work: a major bear market, a glass ceiling of peak capitalist power, and the breakdown of 
the  dominant  dogma  of  forwarding-looking  finance.  And  these  conditions  have 
coincided only in the two periods indicated in ‘Systemic Fear’ – the 1930s and the 2000s.    
 
Toward Behavioural Marxism? Toward Behavioural Marxism? Toward Behavioural Marxism? Toward Behavioural Marxism?    
 
But Kliman claims that the problem is not only empirical; it’s also theoretical. Think of a 
situation,  he  says,  in  which  ‘you’  (the  investor?)  believe  that  capitalism  is  about  to 
collapse, but you are not entirely sure (the probability of collapse is less than 100 per 
cent).  Next,  assume  that  someone  comes  along  and  invites  you  to  make  a  small 
investment that will yield an extremely high rate of return. If capitalism collapses, you lose 
your  investment  (no  pain,  no  gain);  but  if  it  doesn’t,  you  become  fabulously  rich 
(fulfilling your mission on earth). Now, between you and me (wink), wouldn’t you grab 
this  golden  opportunity  and  invest?  And  given  that  you  would  go  ahead  and  invest 
(assuming you are like most people – i.e. most capitalists), isn’t your decision a clear 
proof that the future of capitalism is irrelevant for capitalists (like you)? 
And if the logic of greed isn’t enough, there are the scientific experiments. 
According  to  Kliman,  these  experiments  repeatedly  show  that  ‘people’  (capitalists?) 
continue to invest in stocks, almost to the very end. They invest when earnings go up; 
they invest when earnings come down; in fact, they invest even when they know, with 
certainty, that earnings will converge to zero and that the equities they buy will become 
worthless  at  a  definite  point  in  time.  And  since  these  experiments  show  that  the 
investment behaviour of people (capitalists?) is more or less independent of the future of 
their system (i.e., the end of the experiment), the very notion of ‘systemic fear’ – at least in Kliman on Systemic Fear, Bichler and Nitzan 
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the way that Bichler and Nitzan describe it – is irrelevant and in fact meaningless.  
These  are  very  interesting  claims,  particularly  when  coming  from  a 
fundamentalist Marxist.12  
Marxism correctly rejects the neoclassical dogma. The neoclassical tenets – 
egocentrism, the emphasis on individual rationality, the belief that the market is natural, 
the sanctification of private property and the rejection of societal planning, to name but a 
few – are not natural laws, but the mere objectification of the capitalist creed. According 
to Marxist epistemology, the autonomous, utility-maximising individual is an oxymoron; 
an impossibility that can be concocted only by the misguided ideological servants of 
capital. From the viewpoint of Marxists, human beings are not stand-alone entities, but 
creatures of their society. They have a certain freedom to think and act, but in the final 
analysis, their thoughts and actions are bound by the class relations and the forces of 
production of their own historical epoch. 
Adhering  to  this  epistemology,  though,  has  proven  easier  said  than  done. 
Although critical of the liberals, Marxists have by and large failed to develop their own 
accounting system, their own unique data and their own dedicated research methods. 
And so, gradually, pressed by academic necessity and tempted by the available alternative, 
they have gravitated toward the ever-expanding databases and increasingly sophisticated 
methods of their class enemy, the bourgeoisie. 
During the 1950s and 1960s, Marxists started to use the capitalist national 
accounts and measurements of the ‘capital stocks’. But there was a hefty price to pay: the 
derivation of these quantities relies on the very assumptions that Marxists correctly reject. 
‘Real GDP’, for instance, is aggregated based on the supposition that the statistician 
knows equilibrium prices, and that these equilibrium prices reflect the relative utilities of 
the produced goods and services. Similarly with the ‘capital stock’: its magnitude, which 
many Marxists cite without a second thought, is taken to measure the util-generating 
capacity of the underlying machines and structures. And so, paradoxically, when Marxists 
routinely employ such measures to denote economic growth rates or the pace of capital 
accumulation, they end up endorsing the conceptual tools with which the ruling capitalist 
class manages society, as well as the individualistic-hedonic-equilibrium ideology that this 
ruling class imposes.13  
And that is just for starters. In subsequent decades, many Marxists began using 
bourgeois econometrics, and in so doing abandoned the last vestige of dialectics. They 
developed closed models with mathematical propositions and proofs, and in so doing 
made their arguments increasingly ahistorical. They succumbed to the elegance of game 
theory, and in so doing accepted the rational-atomistic starting point of conventional 
economics. And now we learn from Kliman that it is perfectly fine for a Marxist to invoke 
the findings of experimental economics and behavioural finance.  Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 4 (2011) 
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Now, as noted, our own work starts from finance. This choice has nothing do 
with convenience or fashion. We start from finance because finance is the heart and brain 
of  the  modern  capitalist  mode  of  power.  The  capitalisation  ritual  of  finance  is  the 
algorithm with which capitalists creorder their society, and the relative magnitudes that 
emerge from that ritual map the ever-changing terrain of capitalised power. Deciphering 
modern finance is the initial step for any understanding of how modern capitalist power 
is organised, imposed and altered. 
Kliman, though, adheres to a different approach. For him the only real capital is 
one created by production denominated in socially necessary abstract labour time (or its 
‘real’ price equivalent). The rest – i.e., finance – is a speculative operation in the sphere of 
exchange that sometimes matches and sometimes mismatches the movement of actual 
capital. And whatever has to do with speculations, bubbles and other mismatches or 
distortions can be safely delegated to the neoclassical experiments of Nobel laureates and 
the psychological analysis of behavioural finance.  
But then, if this is the micro-Marxism Kliman has to offer, it is a strange one 
indeed: a representative experiment of representative gamblers, sans quotes, who serve to 
represent the universal human bourse, with no classes, no struggle, no dialectics, for ever 
and  ever.  Note  that  the  participants  in  Kliman’s  experiments  are  not  capitalists,  but 
‘people’ (in America everyone has an equal opportunity to buy up Microsoft or sleep 
under the bridge). These people are examined not in a real, power-based society, but in a 
laboratory  ‘game’  for  which  they  are  hired  or  volunteer  (since,  at  the  moment,  the 
experiment is still too complicated for rats). There is no ruling class, no power belt and no 
underlying  population  of  workers,  unemployed  and  the  redundant.  There  is  only  a 
collection of Marshallian ‘representatives’. These ideal types play their game not in order 
to control their society and shape their world, but simply to make a buck (the universal 
drive of all people at all times, even if the buck happens to be hypothetical). And most 
importantly, the questions they face have no bearing on their own future, let alone on the 
future of their society. Once the experiment is over (and capitalism ends) they can go 
home and forget all about it.  
The ultimate purpose of these experiments is to discover, once and for all, the 
eternal human ‘nature’ of the universal investor – and in the process to annul the very 
heart of Marxism. According to Alan Greenspan, this human nature can be conventional, 
or perverse. What matters, he explains, is “not whether human response is rational or 
irrational, only that it is observable and systematic” (Greenspan, 2008). And perhaps 
Kliman feels that Marxists have much to learn from these natural-state-of-things models 
that  the  capitalist  rulers  impose  on  themselves  and  on  their  subjects.  What  remains 
unclear, though, is how any of this relates to the long-term outlook of the capitalist ruling 
class. To use simulated stock market experiments to tell us about the systemic confidence 
and fear of present-day capitalists is like using a chess game to understand the mindset of Kliman on Systemic Fear, Bichler and Nitzan 
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the French nobility during the French Revolution, or a board game of Monopoly to 
understand the anxiety of capitalists during the 1930s.  
In  our  paper,  we  claimed  that  capitalist  belief  in  the  permanence  of 
capitalisation is a prerequisite for investment. This is a foundational claim. It deals not 
with this or that profit flow, with this or that asset, or with this or that capitalist. Instead, it 
refers to the basic institution of the capitalist mode of power: the institution that makes 
finance in general and capitalist calculations in particular possible to begin with, the 
institution that pervades everything capitalists do, the institution that holds their power 
structure together. The validity of our claim is tied to the centrality of this institution, and 
that is why we expressed our claim hypothetically, as a thought experiment. This is also 
why we brought different historical examples of systemic collapse – from the fall of the 
last Babylonian emperor Belshazzar, to the French Revolution, to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union – instances during which a latent but deep crisis suddenly gave way to 
disintegration.  The  crises  themselves  had  different  causes;  but  what  made  them 
culminate in collapse, we argued, was that the rulers were struck by systemic fear: they 
lost their confidence in their own dogma and their ability to rule. And such losses – as 
well as their consequences – are difficult if not impossible to predict.  
“[T]he future comes disguised”, says Coetzee; “if it came naked, we would be 
petrified  by  what  we  saw”  (1990,  p.  163).  To  ask  what  will  happen  to  capitalism  if 
capitalists become convinced that capitalisation is about to end is like asking what will 
happen to the ecosystem if earth surface temperature rises by 25 per cent. No laboratory, 
even one run by a Nobel laureate, can replicate this process.  
Finally, Kliman invokes the ‘S’-word: Bicher and Nitzan, he says, have turned 
capital into a ‘Subject’, capable of triggering its own demise, and they have voiced this 
claim using tongue-twisting concepts and irrefutable Freudian conjectures. We prefer to 
remain silent on the second allegation. The interested reader can judge for herself by 
reading our articles and books. But we have to plead guilty to the first accusation. Capital 
is certainly a subject, and with a capital ‘S’ to boot. In fact, if we are to remain true to Marx, 
we should add that, save for rare revolutionary situations, capital is the only social subject, 
the entity that subjugates all else – capitalists as well as workers – to its will and rage.  
 
Marxists Contra Marx Marxists Contra Marx Marxists Contra Marx Marxists Contra Marx    
    
Kliman seems to have been deeply offended by our position ‘versus Marx’, as he puts it, so 
a few closing comments about this subject may be in order.  
We have the greatest admiration for Marx as a revolutionary scientist, and we 
have learned a great deal from his path-breaking work on the capitalist system. But like 
Marx (and unlike many Marxists), our real interest is not in Marx, it is in capitalism.  Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 4 (2011) 
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Marx tried to trace the intricacies of human history, to map its progressive 
breakthroughs,  and  to  understand  its  regressive  setbacks.  He  focused  on  the  critical 
aspects  of  the  capitalist  regime,  searching  for  weak  points  in  the  fortified  walls  that 
protected the capitalist rulers. He tried to anticipate the development of capitalism, to 
identify the inner contradictions that would pave the way for a revolution.  
But Marx’s work mirrored his own epoch. And as capitalism continued to 
develop and mutate, his theories, research and conclusions have become less and less 
congruent with the ever-changing reality. As a result, radicals have come to face two 
mutually  exclusive  options.  In  the  words  of  Cornelius  Castoriadis, they  have  had  to 
decide whether to remain revolutionaries or ‘Marxists’. To choose the former meant to 
take from Marx what seemed true, insightful and useful – and to let go of the rest. To 
choose the latter meant to sanctify all of Marx’s writings and then constantly ‘reinterpret’ 
them to fit the shifting reality. 
Some radicals chose the former path, but many more took the latter. After 
Marx’s  death,  there  emerged  numerous  congregations  and  sects,  each  with  its  own 
theological  interpretation.  Until  the  1960s  and  1970s,  the  fault  lines  were  largely 
geopolitical.  The  main  debate  was  between  Moscow  and  Beijing,  with  subsidiary 
interpretations emerging later on in lesser communist capitals, such Belgrade, Havana 
and Pyongyang.  
The unravelling of Stalinism and Maoism and the winding down of the Cold 
War shifted the centre of gravity to the universities of Europe and North America. But 
that shift hasn’t liberated the Marxists from Marx. Instead of an open-ended scientific 
debate on the changing nature of capitalism, there developed a closed theological debate 
about the eternal nature of Marx’s writings (what did Marx really mean?). There are 
exceptions – some of which are ingenious – but for many Marxists the key questions have 
become those of how to appropriate the prophet’s writing; and of what might be done to 
fortify the faith.  
The consequence is a minute division of labour, not unlike the neoclassical 
one, between different groups of Marxists and post-Marxists, each of which specialises in 
protecting a different section of the Great Marxist Wall. There are experts on the ‘young 
Marx’, on ‘Marxist philosophy’ and on ‘Marxist dialectics’. Some deal with the ‘Marxist 
theory  of  the  state’,  while  others  focus  on  ‘cultural  Marxism’.  There  are  pundits  for 
‘analytical Marxism’, ‘Marxism and game theory’, and ‘Marxist anthropology’. There are 
even those who claim to do ‘political Marxism’ (suggesting that Marxism can also be a-
political). Within ‘Marxian economics’ proper, there are those who do ‘crisis’, others who 
do  ‘regulation  and  the  social  structures  of  accumulation’,  and  still  others  who  do 
‘investment and profit rates’. There is even a specialisation in ‘fictitious capital’ and its 
various distortions. The list goes on. Of course, not all of these specialists are defensive of 
the dogma, but many are. Kliman on Systemic Fear, Bichler and Nitzan 
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 At the analytical heart of these specialised endeavours stand the experts on 
Marx’s labour theory of value and surplus value. Most Marxists are unfamiliar with the 
intricacies  of  this  theory,  and  most  ‘productive  labourers’,  however  defined,  would 
probably find its language impossible to understand – that is, assuming they even tried. 
But this theory is the foundation stone of Marx’s science.14 It is the key to understanding 
capitalist exploitation, capitalist development, and, eventually, capitalism’s own demise. It 
has to be defended, if only in appearance.  
This is the forte of Andrew Kliman. His own section in the Great Marxist Wall 
is the theory’s internal ‘consistency’. This section has been somewhat weakened since 
Bortkiewicz, but not to worry. A new and improved reading of the theory – the Temporal 
Single System Interpretation, or TSSI – has recently been applied to the weak points, and 
apparently it works wonders.15  
For defenders such as Kliman, the key thing is to save Marx from deviant 
interpretations. Our 2009 Capital as Power contains a systematic critique of liberal and 
Marxist theories of capital and the elementary particles of utils and abstract labour on 
which these theories rest; it develops an alternative approach to capital based on power; it 
offers an analytical, historical and empirical exposition of a new theory of differential 
accumulation; and it provides a new history of the capitalist mode of power. In short, it is 
an important book to ignore – and, indeed, so far no Marxist has reviewed it. Even 
Kliman, who broke the wall of silence, is careful to ignore the gist of our framework, 
theory and findings: his main concern is to defend his own defence of Marx’s value theory 
– a defence that our book deals with only briefly.  
Sadly, the zeal to defend Marx has caused many of the defenders to lose their 
grip on reality. The period since 2000 has seen capitalism rocked by major turbulence, 
and the free-market dogma has been challenged openly from within and without. Liberal 
economics  –  including  its  macro  and  micro  variants,  its  Keynesian  and  Monetarist 
inflections,  its  expectations  and  game  theories  –  seems  to  have  lost  its  intellectual 
compass, and there have been open calls on Nobel laureates to return their Sveriges 
Riksbank Prizes. This has been the historical opportunity Marxists have been waiting for 
since the 1930s, and they seem to have missed it. Instead of developing new theories and 
new research programmes, they  were busy defending Marx  and ridiculing or simply 
ignoring radicals who tried to transcend him. And when the time finally came, they were 
caught off guard. Marxists today talk of speculative-fictitious bubbles and the tendency of 
the rate of profit to fall, of a too-weak or a too-strong state, of capitalist irrationality, greed 
and corruption. But deep down inside, many of them know that these reiterations belong 
to the world of yesterday. They offer no serious challenge, let alone an alternative, to the 
current capitalist mode of power.  
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Notes Notes Notes Notes    
 
1 The difference between heteronomy and autonomy is articulated in the social and 
philosophical writings of Cornelius Castoriadis – see, for example, his Philosophy, 
Politics, Autonomy (1991). 
2 Means’ claim that there were in fact two types of prices – administered prices as well as 
market prices – was brilliantly defended against charges of empirical error levelled by 
Chicago School Nobel laureate George Stigler, but eventually swept under the carpet 
by the economics profession. By  contrast,  his empirical data on the separation of 
corporate control from ownership were shown to be faulty by the relatively unknown 
Marxist Maurice Zeitlin, yet continue to inform  mainstream business studies (see 
Berle and Means, 1932; Means, 1935, 1972; Stigler and Kindahl, 1970, 1973; and 
Zeitlin, 1974).  
3 One of the first, and still unparalleled, histories of cosmology is Arthur Koestler’s The 
Sleepwalkers (1959), a story that is nicely complemented by Simon Singh’s more 
recent Big Bang (2004). On the measurement of the standard meter, see Alder’s The 
Measure of All Things (2002). The development of mathematics is told in Singh’s 
Fermat’s Last Theorem (1997). 
4 These dualities are introduced in Part I of Capital as Power (Nitzan and Bichler, 2009), 
and are further developed in the rest of the book. 
5 This definition is more precise than the  one in Bichler and Nitzan (2008). In the 
original article, we referred to a downtrend in stock prices. Here we operationalise this 
downtrend as a falling 10-year centred moving average.  
6 The measurement of ‘constant dollars’ involves significant theoretical and philosophical 
quandaries that economists are yet to solve. Our concern here, though, is not the 
logical underpinnings of the measurement, but the mindset of capitalists. And since 
capitalists take constant-dollar measures for granted, these difficulties need not distract 
us (for more on these issues, see Nitzan, 1992: Chs. 5 and 7).  
7 On the differential ratio of net profit to wages, see Bichler and Nitzan’s ‘Elementary 
Particles of the Capitalist Mode of Power’ (2006: Figure 5). On capital’s share of 
national income, aggregate concentration and differential accumulation, see Nitzan 
and Bichler’s Capital as Power (2009a: Figure 13.1, p. 274; Figure 14.1, p. 318; and 
Figure 14.2, p. 320). 
8 Elsewhere in our work we examined the differential process by which capitalist power 
breaks through its geographic-societal ‘envelopes’ – from the industry, to the sector, to 
the national setting, and, finally, to the global arena (e.g. see Nitzan, 2001; Nitzan and 
Bichler, 2009a, Ch. 15). In this process, the power of capitalists that are based in one 
region or country could expand by creating, altering and taking over capitalist power in Kliman on Systemic Fear, Bichler and Nitzan 
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other regions and countries. U.S.-based capitalists have done so after the 1930s by 
raising the profit share of their foreign subsidiaries from 5 per cent to over 30 per cent 
of the total. But since this redistribution too is self-limiting, a repeat of that process 
nowadays seems less than likely. 
9  Current  earnings  feature  in  capitalisation  only  insofar  as  they  alter  the  long-term 
earnings trend. In the case of corporate equities, this impact usually is negligible and 
can be ignored.  
10 For example, during much of the period from the early 1950s to the early 1970s, the 
rates of change of equity prices and the rate of interest were negatively correlated (with 
interest rates measured by the tax-free yield on AAA municipal bonds). This negative 
association means that, during that period, the observed correlation between the rates 
of change of equity prices and current profits identified by Kliman may have been 
spurious.  The  same  cannot  be  said  about  the  2000s,  since  the  rates-of-change 
correlation  between  equity  prices  and  the  rate  of  interest  during  that  period  was 
positive. The case of the 1930s is more ambiguous. There was a negative correlation 
between the rates of change of prices and the rate of interest, but the variations of the 
rate of interest were very small relative to the variations in current earnings, suggesting 
that  their  impact  on  prices  was  probably  far  smaller  than  the  impact  of  current 
earnings. 
11 Although it is probably too early to tell, the 2010 data in Figure 3 suggest that the 
correlation between the rates of change of stock prices and current earnings is no 
longer positive. A continuation of this situation would mean that capitalists no longer 
suffer from systemic fear.  
12 For the difference between neo-Marxists and fundamentalist Marxists, see for example 
Sherman (1985). 
13 For more on the individualistic-hedonic-equilibrium assumptions of ‘real’ economic 
measurements, see Nitzan (1989) and Nitzan and Bichler (2009a: Chs. 5 and 8). 
14 Marx claimed his theory to be superior to the bourgeois alternatives, partly because it 
did something they couldn’t: it objectively derived the rate of profit from the material 
conditions of the labour process. Prices of production, writes Marx, “are conditioned 
on the existence of an average rate of profit’, which itself ‘must be deduced out of the 
values of commodities … Without such a deduction, an average rate of profit (and 
consequently a price of production of commodities), remains a vague and senseless 
conception” (Marx, 1909, Vol. 3, pp. 185-86, emphasis added). This same point is 
reiterated  by  Engels:  ‘These  two  great  discoveries,  the  materialistic  conception  of 
history and the revelation of the secret of capitalist production through surplus value, 
we owe to Marx. With these discoveries socialism became a science. The next thing Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies, Issue 4 (2011) 
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was to work out all its details and relations’ (Engels, 1966, Section I, emphases added). 
15  According  to  Kliman  and  McGlone  (1999,  pp.  33-34),  the  TSSI  “vindicates  the 
internal  consistency  of  Marx’s  most  challenged  theoretical  results  without 
relinquishing his theory’s quantitative determinacy or absorbing it into the theories of 
his critics”, and “is able to make sense out of crucial aspects of [Marx’s] value theory 
that the standard interpretation (and others) have always found to be incoherent” (p. 
55). See also Kliman (2004; 2007).  
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